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DECONSTRUCTION AND MARXISM: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND SOCIETY 
Michael McQuade* 
The law in its majestic impartiality forbids rich and poor alike to 
sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and steal bread. 
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Anatole France! 
Let us pretend that two people, one a Marxist political theorist 
and the other a deconstructionist literary theorist, come across a sign 
bearing the above epigram from Anatole France. The Marxist theorist 
interprets the sign from a politico-economic perspective and concludes 
that 'law reflects the interest of the ruling class, and is a means of 
perpetuating a social order.' The deconstructionist theorist says, 'this 
sign reflects the prevailing ontological and epistemological perspectives, 
in thatitaccepts both the existence ofa thing called 'law' per se, and that 
the world consists of a series of oppositional pairs' (here, for example, rich 
and poor). 
At first glance, these two opinions do not seem to have much in 
common, nor are their implications for law obvious. Yet, both have much 
to offer contemporary legal studies. Each, in its own way, brings to light 
some of the unarticulated biases which support both the existing legal 
tradition and society at large. 
The basic theories of deconstruction and Marxism and their 
respective implications for society are outlined first. In brief, both are 
critical of hegemonies evident in liberal capitalist society: the 
deconstructionist of structuralist epistemology, and the Marxist of 
capitalism. From this it should become evident that the two are not as 
dissimilar as they might seem at the outset. Their similarity will be 
made more explicit as the implications of each for legal theory are 
explored. Specifically, I shall compare the deconstructionist and Marx-
ist theories on the origin oflaw, the functions oflaw, and the future of 
law. It is proposed that not only will these two schools arrive at many 
of the same conclusions about the present state oflaw, but that they both 
point to a new way of viewing law and society. 
DECONSTRUCTION: THE TEXT AND SOCIETY 
It is commonly thought that Jacques Derrida founded the 'school' of 
deconstructionist literary theory in France in the 1950s. However, 
Derrida himself would say that such a statement would involve a 
displacement- a misreading- of his work insofar as it seems to suggest 
that literature and literary theory can be viewed in isolation from the 
society in which they exist. Central to Derrida's work is the notion that 
there is nothing outside of the text. This will require elaboration. In 
order to place deconstruction in its proper context, however, a brief 
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history of semiotics (the interpretation of signs and symbols) and literary 
theory is required. 
Any discussion of literary theory must begin, however briefly, 
with Ferdinand de Saussure's 1916 magnum opus Course in General 
Linguistics. Briefly, de Saussure rejected the view that language was to 
be viewed 'diachronically'- that is, in its historical development- in 
favour ofa 'synchronic' approach.2 De Saussure had two main points: (1) 
at any point in time, language is a complete set of written and oral 
symbols; and (2) the written word is somehow more valuable than the 
spoken word. 
First, in de Saussure's model, language is, at any given point in 
time, a complete system of symbols. Each symbol, or sign as is more 
commonly used, consists of a "signifier" (a sound-image or, more usually, 
its graphic equivalent) and a signified (the thing or concept repre-
sented).3 De Saussure's model begins, then, from a standard western 
metaphysical perspective which privileges 'presence'; it begins with the 
acceptance, in Platonic terms, of an archetype or universal which the 
mind immediately grasps.4 In applying this to semiotics, it means that 
the three letters d, o, and g, when arranged in that order represent to the 
mind a four-legged domestic animal, the canine. 
Second, de Saussure divided systems of communication into two 
parts, langue and parole. In structuralist thought, langue, meaning both 
the written word and the system of laws governing those words, is 
privileged over parole, the verbal articulation and communication of a 
community: 
Saussure argued that langue was the more important 
element in the understanding of language because the 
system ofrelations among various signs is what consti-
tutes a language. Specific examples of parole, that is 
specific speech acts by speakers in a linguistic commu-
nity, are only possible because of the preexisting langue 
that speakers unconsciously rely upon to understand 
each other.5 
Such a view was consistent with de Saussure's basic aim of 
articulating a science oflanguage; it is easier to study what can be seen 
(langue) than what can not (parole). 
In various formulations, these basic dualisms- signifier/signi-
fied, langue/parole, and synchronic/diachronic- formed the basis of 
structuralist semiotics. Structuralism held the day almost unchal-
lenged until the 1950s when a few literary theorists brought their critical 
focus to bear on their own discipline. The first to do so was Northrop Frye 
who challenged the 'ahistoricity' of the structuralist approach by at-
temptingto place the structuralist constructs within a definite historical 
context. 6 The most significant attack, however, came shortly after when 
Derrida questioned the metaphysical underpinnings of the structuralist 
beliefs.7 
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The notion of 'relativity' was always present in structuralist 
theorizing- in fact, it was central to it. For the structuralists this 
relativism was essential for definition- the signifier 'cat' represented the 
signified 'cat' by virtue of being other than 'hat' or 'car' or anything else. 
However, it was not until Derrida that people began to fully realize the 
implications of the fact that the 'signified' does not correspond neatly to 
any one signifier, but only to what it is not. 
Central to Of Grammatology, Derrida's study of the writing of 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, is the notion that standard metaphysics con-
sists of defining the world in terms of binary opposites (e.g., light/dark, 
good/bad, etc.), one of which is taken to be the original and model, and the 
other subordinate and derivative.s At the same time that it is derived 
from the original, the latter is the opposite of, and therefore a threat to, 
the former. If the first is valued, the second can legitimately be 
suppressed. 9 One should begin to see the legal and political implications 
of the traditional metaphysic. 
In Derrida's view, this system ofprioratization is problematic. In 
its place he proposes a new theory which seeks to avoid such prioratization. 
Central to his theory are the concepts of 'differance', 'trace' and 
'supplementarity'. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
While for structuralists the notion of difference was something 
to be overcome, for Derrida it provides the key to understanding. Derrida 
termed this 'differance'. "The French word 'differance' is a neologism 
that combines two verbs - to differ, as in spatial distinction or relation to 
another, and to defer, as in temporalizing delay."10 This relation- "the 
inscription of other-relations is the self same"- Derrida describes as 
"radical alterity".11 
Derrida begins with, but ultimately rejects, the underlying 
Western Platonic notion ofidentity.12 Western philosophy has always 
begun with and assumed identity as the basis for metaphysical thought: 
anything is identical to itself; if two things are different 
they are not identical to each other. While this seems 
reasonable, it is here that the deconstructionist critique 
begins ... 
The deconstructionist wants to show that the notion of identity, 
which seems so basic, so 'present', actually depends upon difference 
because a thing cannot be identical to something unless it can be 
different from something else. Identity is only comprehensible in terms 
of difference, just as difference can only be understood in terms of 
identity.13 
Thus Derrida deconstructs the notion that one half of any binary 
system is necessarily dominant and original while the other is independ-
ent of, and subordinate to, the former. Not surprisingly, since this 
metaphysic underlies de Saussure's languelparole dichotomy, it too can 
be deconstructed. 
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If, as we have seen, langue and parole are not two discrete 
notions, but only, analogically, two sides of the same coin, this begs the 
question of the origin of language: 
Language must have begun with speech acts, and through 
history the collection of past speech acts (parole) was 
consolidated to create a linguistic system (langue). On 
the other hand, speech acts could not have been under-
stood without some pre-existing structure ... No matter 
how far back we go into history, each speech act seems 
to require a pre-existing linguistic and semantic struc-
ture in order to be intelligible, but any such structure 
could not come into being without a history of pre-
existing speech acts by past speakers. Neither langue 
nor parole could be a foundational concept in a theory of 
language because each is mutually dependent upon the 
existence of the other.14 
How then do we get around this problem of identity/ non-
identity? Simply stated, we don't need to; the problem of identity/non-
identity, it follows logically, can and must be both the problem and the 
solution simultaneously. This is the notion of 'differance' of which we 
have already spoken. 
Recalling that 'differance' meant both spatial and temporal 
distinction which exists between words, this leads Derrida to another 
important concept: the differential relation of alterity, which he titles 
'trace': 
The word 'trace' is a metaphor for the effect of the 
opposite concept, which is no longer present but has left 
its mark on the concept we are now considering. The 
trace is what makes deconstruction possible; by identi-
fying the traces of the concepts in each other, we identify 
their mutual conceptual dependence. 15 
Although he labels this differential relationship, Derrida resists 
the attempt to privilege even it metaphysically; in Derrida's theory 
neither differance nor trace can be allowed to dominate. From this, 
Derrida derives his theory of 'supplementarity'. 
In Of Grammatology Derrida critiques the hierarchy of speech 
over writing through 'the logic of the supplement'. The term 'supple-
ment' derives from Rousseau who described writing as a 'supplement' to 
speech; Rousseau believed that the natural state of language was 
spoken, with the written word evolving from speech.16 We have already 
seen one problem with this view, but here the social consequences of such 
a view become obvious through Derrida's notion of'supplementarity'. 
The word 'supplement' has many meanings, only two of which 
concern us here: it can mean "something added to an already complete 
or self-sufficient thing", but it can also mean "something added to 
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something lacking in order to make it complete."17 Given Rousseau's 
onto-theology (namely, his Platonic tendencies) he could only have 
intended the former meaning. In fact, this is confirmed by Rousseau who 
feared that writing "might infect the purity of speech."18 But, Derrida 
suggests, this is problematic. Speech can not be, as Rousseau suggests, 
whole and pure because logically writing can only supplement speech if 
speech is already lacking something (even if that lacuna is only the 
supplement of speech). 
Thus speech is not pure and writing impure, or a mediation of 
speech. Speech is, like writing, only a supplement of something else 
(thought), and obviously an incomplete representation of it. This leads 
to an obvious problem: if speech is a supplement, that which it supple-
ments must also be lacking. The result is a chain of supplementarity ad 
infinitum. This allows Derrida, in what J. Balkin calls "the ultimate 
deconstruction of presence",19 to proclaim that: 
[T]here is nothing outside of the text ... What we have 
tried to show by following the guiding line of the "danger-
ous supplement," is that in what one calls .... real life ... 
there has never been anything but writing; there have 
never been anything but supplements, substitutive 
significations which could only come forth in a chain of 
differential references ... [T]he absolute present, Na-
ture, ... ha[s] always already escaped, ha[s] never 
existed.2° 
So far, it has been suggested that the Derridean notion of 
differance allows one to deconstruct words and the philosophical con-
structs which support them. Adopting Derrida's supplementarity no-
tion, one can then move on to deconstruct metaphysical principles 
underlying society, and ultimately then, society itself. In "The White 
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" - his study of Anatole 
France's The Garden of Epicurus - Derrida gives an example of how this 
might be accomplished.21 
Derrida titles the first section of "White Mythology" 'exergue' 
which has both a numismatic meaning, namely "the space on a coin ... 
reserved for inscription", and an epigraphical meaning of something 
"outside,the work."22 Similarly, he subtitles the first section 'usure' a 
word which has two meanings, one economic and the other linguistic. 
'Usure' in French means both the acquisition of too much interest, and 
using up or deterioration through usage.23 These 'latent' connections 
between language and economics are soon made manifest. 
In The Garden of Epicurus, Polyphilos and Aristos carry on a 
conversation in which the former ruminates on the grinding down of 
coins until nothing, not even the sovereign image, is visible in their 
crown pieces. He suggests that "metaphysicians, when they make a 
language for themselves, are like ... knife-grinders" who, by erasing the 
images of the sovereign attempt to free the crown pieces from all limits 
of time and space.24 But Polyphilos is anxious to retrieve the capital to 
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restore the" 'original figure' of the coin which has been worn away ... in 
the circulation of the philosophical concept."25 Thus, Derrida concludes, 
it is the very possibility ofrestoring, beneath the metaphor which hides 
it, the 'original figure' of the coin which is central to the metaphysics. 
The primitive meaning is physical. This meaning becomes 
metaphorical when philosophy puts it into circulation. At that point, 
however, "the first meaning and the first displacement are then forgot-
ten. The metaphor is no longer noticed, and it is taken for the proper 
meaning." 26 France titles this co-option of the primitive meaning, 
'White Mythology'. Derrida asserts that Western thought acts in such 
a manner by seeking to escape appearances, but is condemned then to 
live "in a world of allegory": 
Metaphysics - the white mythology which reassembles 
and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes 
his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own 
logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal 
form of that he must still wish to call Reason .... White 
Mythology- metaphysics has erased within itself the 
fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that 
nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in 
white ink, an invisible design covered over in the 
palimpsest. 27 
The influence of these theories has not stopped at the edge of 
literary theory. Clearly these theories exist in society because they 
support society. By deconstructing the metaphysical grounding upon 
which society rests, Derrida seeks to bring society itself into the critical 
discourse. 
Deconstruction begins with, but ultimately rejects, the tradi-
tional Western notions of ontology (the study of being) and epistemology 
(the study of knowledge and reality). Rather, deconstructionism begins 
with a critique of traditional formalist literary theory, and through the 
notions ofradical alterity, differance, supplementarity and trace, posits 
an entirely new manner of perceiving literature and ultimately the 
world. Broadly speaking, the deconstructionist critique of structuralism 
is that it seeks to overcome difference by the imposition of a literary and 
social system which is based ultimately on physics, and is, to that degree, 
rationally unsupportable. It sees everything as meaning distinct but not 
discrete. Everything is related ultimately through the chain of 
supplementarity. In both its critique of metaphysics, and its emphasis 
on the oppositions that exist within society, one can see the similarities 
to Marxist theory. 
MARXISM: ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 
It is commonly held that it is impossible to speak of the orthodox 
Marxism. At best, one can speak of an orthodox Marxism; a theory which 
is not inconsistent with that which Marx wrote. One is not surprised to 
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encounter such a problem in discussing a 'Marxist theory of law' since 
Marx, in spite of his university training in law, never completed a 
systematic study oflaw.28 Rather, he alluded often but usually briefly 
and indirectly to the role of law in the development of the capitalist 
economy. As many recent writers have suggested, however, this indeter-
minacy applies also to Marx's more purely economic writings. It is with 
them that we must begin our discussion. 
The main notion derived from the writing of Marx is that society 
is economically determined. Economic relationships, or more accurately 
relationships to the control of the means of production, dominate society. 
Central to any Marxist theory is 'the base/superstructure metaphor': 
In the social production of their life, men enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable and independ-
ent of their will, relations of production which corre-
spond to a definite stage of development of their material 
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, 
the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms 
of social consciousness.29 
Yet, even this passage which is at the heart of any Marxist analysis has 
not been free from problems of interpretation. 
Two mairi schools of Marxism have arisen and are divided on, 
inter alia, the questions of the meanings of the base/structure metaphor 
and the fetishism of commodities. Alvin Gouldner termed these schools 
'scientific' and 'critical' Marxism. The former, he argues: 
is grounded in the axiom of the Soviet Union's celebrated 
metaphysic, "dialectical materialism." It interprets the 
world in one way at all times, and, therefore, it remains 
closed to new advances in philosophy and critical analy-
sis, such as deconstruction.30 
Conversely, critical Marxists tend to be characterized by a: 
rejection of the model of authoritarian central state 
communism. They favour models of socialism which are 
dehierarchized, egalitarian and democratic. Whereas 
the Soviet model privileges productive forces (technol-
ogy, heavy industry, and the like) over relations, thus 
permitting the preservation of capitalist work relations, 
critical Marxists demand a complete transformation of 
the form of work and of all social power relations.31 
Here it is suggested that scientific Marxism is based on a 
misreading of Marx's work. In reducing everything to economic rela-
94 
DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
tions, scientific Marxists privilege economics philosophically in a man-
ner which Marx himself could not have intended. Critical Marxism is not 
only internally consistent in its emphasis on productive relations rather 
than loci of production, but also is compatible with the deconstructionist 
theory of radical alterity. 
In Deconstructionism and Marxism Michael Ryan argues that a 
common misreading of Marx's various writings "conflates them into a 
homogeneous formula", which Ryan suggests, does not exist in reality. 
Central to such misinterpretations is the displacement of Marx's state-
ment in the Communist Manifesto that "the first step in the revolution 
by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling 
class" and "to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the 
state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as a ruling class."32 Ryan argues 
that Marx did not intend that the temporary rule of the proletariat 
should be confused with the 'state' in the bourgeois sense of the word. 
But this is evident even in parts of Lenin's reading of Marx: 
The crucial displacement occurs in the next paragraph. 
"By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the 
vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power 
and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing 
and organizing the new system, of being the teacher, the 
guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people" 
... After establishing the "Marxist" definition of the state 
as the "the proletariat organized as a ruling class,'' Lenin 
substitutes the vanguard party for the proletariat. 33[em-
phasis deleted] 
While Marx's view of society was fluid, and the need for a ruling 
class was only a conduit to a truly socialist society, Lenin here seems to 
suggest that a ruling class, (albeit one composed of proletariat), will be 
necessary at all stages in social history if the revolution is to be given an 
on-going effect. 
The problem, obvious to both critical Marxists and 
deconstructionists, is that if any segment of the proletariat is advanced 
to the position of ruling elite, surely they are no longer proletariat. 
Rather, they would have become de facto part of the ruling elite. Such 
problems of interpretation continue to flourish. Another equally com-
mon difficulty that is no less problematic lies in the assertion that Marx 
reduced all social relations to economics. 
As support for the assertion that Marx would reject out of hand 
such a reductive deterministic perspective, one need only look at the 
work ofMarx's collaborator, Engels. While Engels wrote that "economic 
base is determining only 'in the last instance' or 'in the final analysis"' ,34 
in a letter to Block he also argued that "if somebody twists this . .. into 
saying that the economic factor is the only determining one, he trans-
forms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase."35 
Milovanovic writes: 
DECONSTRUCTION AND MARXISM 
In Engels' letter to Borgius in 1894, Engels stated that 
the economic condition "ultimately determines histori-
cal development"; however, although "political, legal, 
philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., develop-
ment is based on economic development ... all these react 
upon one another and also upon the economic base." 
Further, he states, "one must think that the economic 
situation is cause, and solely active, whereas everything 
else is only passive effect. On the contrary, interaction 
takes place on the basis of economic necessity, which 
ultimately always asserts itself. 36 
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The key word in this passage then is 'determines'. As suggested, the two 
schools of Marxism take different views on the meaning to be ascribed to 
this word. 
In his study of Marxist and Weberian notions of law, Dragan 
Milovanovic distinguishes two notions of'determination' within Marx-
ism. One school (which here has been called 'scientific Marxism' but 
which he calls 'instrumentalist') defines 'determination' as "prediction, 
i.e., some antecedent factor [which] totally predicts, or totally controls-
prefigures- subsequent activity."37 
The other school, which is favoured here and which he calls 
structuralist, defines determination as the setting oflimits through the 
exertion ofpressures.38 Importantly, these pressures are both internal 
and external. Structuralism itself is divided into two schools, 'commod-
ity exchange structuralism' and 'interpellative structuralism'. The 
former sees the economic factors determining in the first instance, while 
the latter "sees the economy determining only in the last instance; it is 
the political and ideological structures that have primal effect."39 This 
notion of three relatively discrete forces acting in society - politics, 
ideology and economics-is called by Poulantzas (the leadinginterpellative 
Marxist legal theorist) and Althusser (a prominent Marxist theorist) the 
theory of 'overdetermination'.40 
While the former definition of determinism is exclusionary, in 
that it excludes the second, the latter definition can, with slight modifi-
cation, exist without excluding the former. If one accepts the instrumen-
talist definition, powerlessness is assumed; people are not actors, but 
powerless receptors of economic laws. While this stems partly from a 
reductive reading of the writings of Marx and Engels, it may also be 
attributable to the bias within the English translation.41 However, a 
fundamentally different view develops from an understanding of the 
interpellative notion of 'inherent determinism'. 
In his letter to Block, to which reference was made earlier, 
Engels wrote that "we make history ourselves, but, in the first place, 
under very definite assumptions and conditions."42 Here the notions 
that 'we make history ourselves' and 'the necessity of definite conditions' 
are equally important. 'Determination' implies not only being subject to 
the forces of economics and history, but also an act of purpose or will. The 
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two meanings of determination are thus clearly distinct, not necessarily 
mutually exclusive: 
Here, determination means that the first factor quali-
fies, or sets the limits to the second. Subjectivity is 
restored. It is not that the individual is a passive 
recipient and reactor; rather, the person finds him/ 
herself constrained, somewhat, by the historical condi-
tions s/he is born into; meaning, that above all else, it is 
the "exertiol). of pressure" by external factors that is 
equated with the notion of determinism. But these 
interact with the subject's desires, wants, capacities, 
abilities (in formulating projects), and strivings (in tran-
scending existing conditions, including by means of 
oppositional praxis).43 [emphasis deleted] 
With this understanding of determination and working back-
wards to the base/superstructure metaphor, one can see that a 
'deconstructive' reading of Marxism (that is, beginning with, but not 
privileging 'determinism', which is itself accomplished by always keep-
ing in mind the larger context in which it exists) suggests that the 
scientific/instrumentalist understanding of Marx is fundamentally a 
misunderstanding of Marx's writings. It onto-theologizes economic 
factors. Only the critical interpellative view of Marx's work allows one 
to escape antinomies and thus a recourse to metaphysics. In the sense 
that it sees economics as both 'supplementing' and 'supplemented by' 
other factors, one of which shall be seen to be law, interpellative Marxism 
is compatible with Derrida's understanding of deconstruction. 
In summarizing Marx's contribution to social theory, there is a 
tendency to think of the modern Soviet applications of 'economic deter-
minism' and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. To do so would be to do 
violence- indeed an injustice- to the theories of Marx. As Marx suggests 
in his Manifesto, the key to Marxist theory is not the loci of production, 
but the relations of production. This is the only understanding of Marx's 
dialectic that is logically consistent with the rest of his work. 
Just as Marx's dialectic demands a fluidity of economic relation-
ships, it demands a similarly malleable notion of society in general. This 
has two main implications for Marxist theoreticians. First, as the 
interpellative Marxists suggest, economics cannot determine society 
absolutely; rather economics interacts dialectically with superstructural 
forces like law and politics to produce society. Second, as Gouldner 
suggests, there must be a transformation of all social power relations 
from reified and hierarchical to fluid and egalitarian. In both its critique 
of scientific Marxism's reliance on a 'metaphysical' reading of the 
material dialectic and its reified social theory, critical or structuralist 
Marxism shares much with Derrida's understanding of deconstruction. 
This is evidenced in their respective views on the law. 
DECONSTRUCTION AND MARXISM 
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Capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its 
own negation. 
Karl Marx44 
Derrida's work manifests a clear understanding of the Hegelian 
dialectic,45 but like many European academics of his generation, he 
came to reject this classical dialectic because of what he perceived as its 
metaphysical nature. Derrida was following in a rather well- worn path. 
After his initial period in the Young Hegelians, Marx also 
rejected Hegel's notion of the historical dialectic. In spite of this similar-
ity, early in his career Derrida rejected the Marxist as well as Hegelian 
dialectic- and for the same reason! The year 1971, however, brought the 
now famous interview with Scarpetti and Houdebine in which Derrida 
was criticized publicly for ignoring the commonalities with Marx, and 
the social utility of deconstruction. 46 This seems to have signalled a shift 
in Derrida's outward attitude towards Marxism, although as shall be 
seen later, his notion of the origin oflanguage from O{Grammatology is 
compatible with Marxist theory even if not framed in classical Marxist 
jargon. 
By 1972 Marxist jargon had begun appearing in Derrida's work. 
In 1976 he spoke explicitly on the role that deconstruction might play in 
exposing ideology. By 1979 he publicly described himself as a Marxist. 47 
Why the change? There is no clear answer, but it appears that Derrida's 
notion of deconstruction itself did not change, but rather it is his 
understanding of Marxism which has evolved. Although Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, and Freud are the obvious influences on Derrida's early 
writing (Freud's role will be explained later), in the later works, Nietzsche 
and Freud are joined by Marx as the dominant figures. 
This paper has thus far suggested that scientific Marxism is both 
a misreading of Marx, and incompatible with a deconstructive episte-
mology. The next step is to suggest that such an epistemology is 
compatible with the critical Marxist school of thought. In Marxism and 
Deconstructionism Michael Ryan has argued for just such a point. 
Al though Ryan develops a full-blown social theory based on both Marxist 
and deconstructionist notions, here one needs only to outline his first 
point: Derrida and Marx develop compatible social theories because they 
share a similar criticism of metaphysics. 
Although they operated in different fields, Marx and Derrida 
share many critical tools: the concepts of relation, difference, and 
antagonism. This leads inevitably to similar results when they discuss 
common subjects, such as the critiques of positivism and idealism. In his 
introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx speaks of the concept or category 
of "production in general". But production he says is not a thing; it is a 
series or segment of relations which Marx calls 'essential difference'.48 
The similarities to Derrida's notion of radical alterity are obvious: 
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For Marx, once alterity, the relation to the other which 
is "internal" to the thing (production), is taken into 
account, one arrives at a full concrete determination, as 
opposed to an empty abstraction. It should be noted that 
the word "determination" [Bestimmung] does not mean 
a self-identical "thing", but instead a locus of relations 
whereby something is constituted by or in relationship 
to other determinations.49 
Although it has been suggested here that Derrida shared this 
notion of 'radical alterity' with other thinkers, the striking lack of a 
meta physic in the critical Marxist reading renders it the most akin to the 
deconstructionist approach. This similarity carries over into their 
respective critiques oflaw and society. 
Some people can imagine approximately what a Marxist theory 
of law might encompass. Fewer would probably be able to envision a 
deconstructionist theory oflaw. In brief, the latter rejects as metaphysi-
cal any law or legal construct which is based upon unassailable first 
principles. Such a theory as well as an interpellative Marxist theory of 
law will be outlined; these two theories are proved to be similar and 
mutually supporting.50 Specifically, an examination of three aspects of 
law is adopted: the origin oflaw(s); the functioning oflaw in society; and 
the future oflaw. It will be evident that, although, for the purposes of 
clarity, these three notions are treated as distinct, there is necessarily 
considerable overlap among them. 
THE ORIGIN OF LAW 
Deconstruction and the Origin of Law 
In the deconstruction of Rousseau's theory of the ongm of 
language, Derrida in Of Grammatology begins to develop a theory on the 
origin and function oflaw. 
In The Social Contract Rousseau declares a centre- "one single 
origin, one single point in the history oflanguages."51 He speaks of the 
movement during 'primitive times' from the development of 'no lan-
guage' to an 'almost language' (signs used amongst family, and even 
then, only infrequently) to language (a full set of signs and symbols). 
According to Rousseau, this accompanied the development of more 
complex social organizations, from families to clans to tribes. Rousseau 
calls this period, when people came together and understood each other, 
the 'time offestivals'. But Derrida draws our attention first to the time 
before the festival: 
What then! Before that time did men spring from the 
earth? Did generations succeed each other without any 
union of the sexes, and without anyone being under-
stood? No: there were families, but there were no 
nations. There were domestic, but not popular, Ian-
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guages. There were marriages but there was no love at 
all. Each family was self-sufficient and perpetuated 
itself by inbreeding. Children of the same parents grew 
up together and gradually they found ways of expressing 
themselves to each other: the sexes became obvious with 
age; natural inclination sufficed to unite them. Instinct 
held the place of passion; habit held the place of prefer-
ence. They became husband and wife without ceasing to 
be brother and sister.52 
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This non-prohibition, however, is interrupted after the festival. 
While the festival is the "moment of pure continuity, of in-difference 
between the time of desire and the time of pleasure", the age that follows 
is the age of"the supplement, of articulation, of signs, ofrepresentatives. 
That is the age of the prohibition ofincest."53 In Rousseau's model, this 
prohibition is the beginning of law. 
Rousseau ascribes to society "a sacred and holy character only to 
the natural voice, ... the natural law ... , it is, ... the social order itself, the 
right oflaw."54 Recognizing family as the original or 'natural' organiza-
tion, society cannot maintain its prohibition except "by convention".55 
As Derrida suggests, however, this displacement of the father figure by 
society does not follow smoothly; "the political father no longer loves his 
children, the element of the law sets him apart"56: 
Rousseau consecrates convention only on one condition: 
that one might universalize it and consider it, even ifit 
were the artifice of artifices, as a quasi-natural law 
conforming to nature. That is exactly the case with this 
prohibition. It is also the case of the order of that first 
and unique convention, or that first unanimity to which, 
the Contract tells us "we must always go back" for 
understanding the possibility oflaw. The origin oflaws 
must be a law.57 [emphasis deleted] 
To make the point clear, Derrida suggests that the two argu-
ments are heterogeneous; neither the prohibition nor the morality can 
be the first cause. He states, "neither of the two is intrinsically pertinent 
to the argument: the morality that condemns incest is constituted from 
the interdict, the former has its origin in the latter."58 From this one can 
derive two important principles. 
First, as Derrida suggests, law does not exist in the Platonic 
sense; there is no 'essential law' in the universe just waiting to be derived 
and applied. Law is created and imposed by society. Second, not only is 
the nature of law prohibitive, but also it is permissive. Law only 
prohibits certain actions to the degree that it imposes other actions in 
their place. Thus Derrida questions not only the metaphysical underpin-
nings of the traditional understanding oflaw, but also its very definition. 
At this juncture, some may begin to question whether in the 
deconstructive model iflaw is ultimately reducible to politics. Iflaw is 
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not a fully autonomous set of rules, is it simply arbitrary, or nothing more 
than politics in another form? In "Deconstruction and Legal Interpreta-
tion" Michel Rosenfeld also asks these questions, and answers clearly 
'no' to both.59 Admitting a certain degree ofindeterminancy, Rosenfeld 
suggests that this answer need not lead inevitably to arbitrariness or a 
morass of uncertainty. He suggests that within traditional society, 
indeterminancy (particularly in economics) is already established as a 
key notion. These two points will be discussed in turn. 
To many, deconstruction is something of a semantic parlour 
game; by denying anything its unity, it is thought to deny everything. 
Yet Rosenfeld suggests that a careful balance can be achieved- between 
past and future, inclusion and exclusion, theory and practice- so that 
deconstruction can accept meaning without recourse to arbitrariness: 
Because the requirements of ontology and those of ethics 
are inscribed in history- that is, because they leave their 
mark on the succession of concrete historical social 
formations - at every moment, they constrain the range 
of possible legitimate meanings without ever imposing a 
single, fully determinate meaning. Hence, ontology and 
ethics, which are always projected both towards the past 
and towards the future, constantly open and close possi-
ble paths of interpretation without ever settling on any 
single, distinct, clearly articulated and exhaustively 
circumscribed. 60 
Thus, although law, politics, and ethics, are related, they are 
also three distinct semantic and historical notions. To those critics who 
suggest that society could not agree on something as intangible or 
ethereal as meaning, Rosenfeld suggests not only that it could do so, but 
also that in market exchanges it already has. 
Rosenfeld analogizes the agreement on semantic exchange with 
agreement on economic exchange within the marketplace. Each com-
modity has both an use value and an exchange value; the former is what 
value each person places on a good for his or her own use, and the latter 
is the value he or she thinks another might value it at (and so, what 
another would be willing to exchange for it).61 Although use and 
exchange values change with circumstance, itis suggested that these 
values, while clearly not objective, are not merely based on subjective 
whims: 
Upon closer scrutiny, the values of commodities on the 
rudimentary market are no more purely subjective than 
they are strictly speaking objective on the fully devel-
oped market. In both cases, such values are 
intersubjective as they are the product of a combination 
of, or a compromise between, the diverse subjective 
desires which seek fulfillment through market transac-
tions. 62 
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That this theory is consonant with many of the notions found in 
Derrida's work is not surprising. In fact, Rosenfeld's paper was written 
for a symposium on deconstruction and the law at which Derrida was the 
keynote speaker. Nor is it surprising that a deconstructionist theory 
should move so easily among linguistics, legal theory, and economics; 
such is expected for a theory which denies the absolute autonomy of each 
of these disciplines, but sees them all as necessarily connected. Derrida 
is emphatic in stressing the social utility of deconstruction in "Force of 
Law," his keynote address to the 1989 Cardozo Law Symposium.63 
Derrida himself has long resisted the 'American' interpretations 
of his work. In particular, he has objected to the manner in which the 
American 'deconstructionist' literary critics (beginning with the Yale 
critics) have misinterpreted his work to support a reactionary epistemol-
ogy and social-structure. 64 Somewhat surprisingly in light of this, his 
address to the Cardozo symposium commended the largely American 
Critical Legal Studies (hereinafter CLS) movement. This is because, 
unlike the American literary critics, the CLS scholars were expanding 
the applications, if not the limits, of his work by moving into the world 
without necessarily going outside the non-existent limits of the text: 
If hypothetically, it had a proper place, which is pre-
cisely what cannot be the case, such a deconstructive 
"questioning" or meta-questioning would be more at 
home in law schools, ... than in philosophy departments 
and much more than in the literature departments 
where it has often been thought to belong.65 
Why law? Law, although related to semiotics, has a direct and 
unmediated bearing on social life in a way that a discipline such as 
literary studies could not. 
It is the notion of praxis, particularly transformative praxis, 
central to so much of the CLS work, that most commends the movement 
to Derrida. He continues: 
They respond, . . . to the most radical programs of a 
deconstruction that would like, in order to be consistent 
with itself, not to remain closed in purely speculative, 
theoretical, academic discourses but rather ... to aspire 
to something more consequential, to change (1) things 
and to intervene in the efficient and responsible though 
always, of course, very mediated way, not only in the 
profession but in what one calls the cite, the polis and 
more generally the world.66 [emphasis deleted] 
The similarity here to Marx's rebuke of Hegelianism- that the 
point of philosophy is not to interpret the world, but to change it67 is too 
obvious to be accidental. That Derrida echoes Marx is not surprising; 
indeed, as suggested above, the deconstructionist and Marxist theories 
on the origin oflaw are very similar. 
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Marxism and the Origins of Law 
As noted, Marx did not write a comprehensive theory oflaw. In 
fact, no such systematic Marxist theory of law existed until 1904 when 
Karl Renner published The Institutions of Private Law. Renner con-
cluded from his study of the private law realm that "economic change 
does not immediately and automatically bring about changes in the 
law."68 While, it shall be argued here that such a view of relative 
autonomy oflaw is the only valid view, it was not immediately accepted 
by all. The most influential of the early Marxist legal theorists was 
Evgeny Pashukanis whose work would today be considered to be part of 
the 'commodity exchange school'. 
Pashukanis published The General Theory of Law and Marxism 
in 1924, but his notion of the "withering away of state and law" was not 
favoured under the Stalinist regime. 69 Consequently, Pashukanis' ideas 
were suppressed, but he has since been restored to the position of one of 
the fathers of Marxist jurisprudence. Although rejected here for being 
overly deterministic, his "commodity exchange theory of law" which 
argues that economics determines law in the first instance is still 
accepted by some.70 It has been surpassed, however, in achievement by 
more contemporary views which take their lead from Renner's work. 
'Interpellative structuralist Marxism' came to the fore in the 
1970s. This school argues that the political and ideological superstruc-
tures are relatively autonomous from the economic base, and that the 
interaction of all three determines the shape of society. This multi-
causal explanation of society is called the theory of over-determina-
tion.71 
An overdeterministic analysis of law in capitalist society must 
be sensitive to the dynamics of commodity exchange; it does not, 
however, argue that legal reform is a reflex of economic change. Thus 
interpellative-structuralist Marxism (hereinafter, simply referred to as 
Marxism) differs from instrumentalist Marxism in that the former sees 
economics as being but one factor operating in relation to others includ-
ing law, which determine the shape of society. Thus Marxism distin-
guishes itself from traditional capitalism in two important ways. First, 
it rejects capitalism's self-understanding as a system of economics 
governed by rational and equitable rules; and second, it rejects the 
underlying assumption that law is an autonomous and apolitical factor 
influencing society from the outside. 
In the capitalist system, law is normally seen as being rational. 
Rationality in law means both a non-contradictory sense of principles, as 
well as a system which is logically connected to the economic system. As 
Duncan Kennedy demonstrates, however, this 'rationalism' is a clearly 
qualified rationality: 
[F]irst ... this body of economic thought is incomprehen-
sible unless it is treated as an aspect of a larger totality. 
The most important non-economic element in that total-
ity is legal thought. Second, the totality functioned 
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ideologically: it operated as a legitimator of oppres-
sion. 72 
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Kennedy thus clearly calls into question the two notions stated above 
that are often thought to underlie the capitalist notion oflaw. 
Law arises in the capitalist economy to regulate the exchange of 
commodities. Neither the notion of the marketplace nor the capitalist 
valuation of commodity is natural, but rather both are products of social 
convention and law. In order to have the value of their own commodity 
guaranteed, each person must agree to a value of the other person's 
commodities. All must agree to a common system of rules to govern 
exchange, or a system of'equivalency'. As the market becomes central, 
the rationality and predictability central to exchange norms governing 
the market transactions become more formalized. In Marxist terminol-
ogy, law developed in conjunction with a society which developed from 
one concerned with 'use values' in trade to one with 'exchange values'. 73 
The notion of capital developed from one which was based on an 
object's use (which depended upon a particular historical situation), to 
one based on an abstract notion of equivalence. A pound of wheat could 
be traded for a dozen eggs because the latter was useful at that time and 
had only a limited life-span (because they would spoil, and would lose 
their usefulness shortly). Conversely, capitalism allowed one, if a buyer 
could be found, to transfer goods into capital that could not spoil. In this 
way, history was transcended. Similarly, the law which developed this 
'ahistorical' notion of capitalism was also necessarily seen to transcend 
history. Here, the Platonic ideal underlying capitalism is evident. 
A simplification of a Marxist critique of law into its elements 
would suggest that the 'fetishization of capital' allowed those who had 
control of goods at the beginning of capitalism to extend this hegemony 
into the future. This required a notion of law which would govern not 
only present actions but also future actions, since capitalism demanded 
an 'ahistorical' market. Thus developed a notion of law governing 
commerce which was seen to transcend the particular historical situa-
tion and relation in which it existed. To adopt the language of the 
deconstructionist, neither law nor capitalism can be posited as a first 
cause, and neither can be seen as complete in and of itself. Thus, 
capitalism required the law as a supplement. 
In the Marxist view of the development of law then, law is 
rationalizing and performative; it explains why someone can do some-
thing (monopolize capital) which economics would suggest should not be 
done. At the same time, law does not so much preclude actions as much 
as it forces compliance under threat of penalty. This analysis is very 
similar to Derrida's critique of Rousseau's view of the origin oflaw; law 
not only prohibits certain action, but forces an acceptance of other forms 
of socio-political or economic relations. 
In the Marxist perspective then, modern law developed initially 
in conjunction with a system oflaissez-faire capitalism and provided the 
justification for that early form of capitalism. As capitalism evolved, so 
too did the system oflaw. Yet if we cannot assert a definite causal link 
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here- that economic changes caused a change in the law or vice versa-
how can the Marxist theory of the necessity of capitalism to evolve be 
explained? This has been done through Habermas' notion of 'interac-
tion'. 
'Interaction' or 'communicative action' is based on 
"intersubjectively shared understandings stemming from reciprocal 
expectations developed by 'consensual norms' of the kind in existence in 
'traditional societies.' "74 A linguistically shared understanding of a 
situation becomes the base for action. Through communicative language 
society reflects changes in economic models at the same time that 
economics reflect changes in society. 
The primary change in society was the development ofrational-
ism, which gave rise to a theory of equivalence. This law of equivalence 
permeated all aspects of rational society, especially, as Milovanovic 
suggests, in the legal sphere: 
It was here that it was given an ideal expression in such 
constitutional principles as formal equality. And with 
this process underway - that is, with the system gener-
ated model forms being increasingly duplicated 7 •• com-
bined with hegemonic groups actively generating myths 
substantiating the righteousness of the prevailing socio-
economic conditions, the insoluble conflict, or the neces-
sity of class struggle is more likely to disappear for the 
consciousness at one level. 75 
Although on one level formal equality in law undermines the 
likelihood of class conflict, on another level it leads logically to conflict. 
As suggested above, capitalist economy has developed from a laissez-
faire system to one requiring substantial state interference in late-
capitalist society. Central to the state's role has been the enforcement 
of these notions of equivalency and formal equality. 
In late capitalist society, state intervention becomes necessary 
to curtail the excesses and antimonies which would develop naturally in 
capitalist society. For example, this state intervention can take the form 
of anti-combines legislation: "the state actively develops an ideology that 
unifies all as citizens with formal rights."76 As Kennedy notes, increas-
ingly these rights are being used to subvert the very process they were 
designed to serve: 
Others within the structural Marxist perspectives, not 
denying the importance of economic as one factor [in 
mediating changing social and legal structures], point 
out the significance of relatively independent factors 
found within the superstructures, i.e., the logic of the 
legal form itselfunfolding; shifting coalitions within the 
power bloc; contradictory concerns felt by higher level 
courts expressed in formulated ideologies justifying ex-
isting social economic and political arrangements; col-
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lective oppositional action such as union, women's lib-
eration, civil rights, anti-nuke movements, and so forth. 
These are not without effect. 77 
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The Marxist critique of the origin oflaw stresses the contradic-
tions over which capitalism glosses; yet these contradictions are essen-
tial if capitalism is to maintain its place in society. The Marxist critique 
of the origin oflaw can be stated succinctly: in capitalist society, law is 
inextricably connected with economics and politics, and following from 
that, law cannot be an autonomous and apolitical 'Platonic' construct as 
suggested by legal formalists. 
An interpellative/structuralist Marxist notion of the origin of 
law has much in common with Derrida's critique of Rousseau's theory of 
the origin oflaw. Like Derrida, who showed that neither the morality nor 
the interdict could be posited as a first cause, the Marxist critique 
suggests that law is not an autonomous body that exists independent of 
society. Law could not have developed independently of capitalist 
society as the legal formalists claim, any more than society could have 
developed without law. Thus law and society operate in a natural 
dialectic; law transforms society, and the social changes demand accom-
modation in law. When one is privileged over the other, as in early 
capitalist society in which capital was privileged over law, contradic-
tions arise. While in later capitalist society, this dialectic has shifted 
with law attaining greater power over capital, the contradictions have 
not been eradicated. 
As one class increasingly dominated economically, there occured 
a recourse to a formalist notion of equality in order to justify the 
inequality in practice. Each person was accorded equal rights under the 
law, even if they could not exercise these rights in practice. This posed 
two problems. First, in order to secure personal freedoms, state inter-
vention and suppression of freedoms became necessary. Second, the 
oppressed classes responded to the formal equalities given them to 
subvert the system of legal hegemony. 
From this, one can draw two conclusions: one, as Derrida 
suggests, law is not inherently prohibitory or negative; and two, that in 
order to continue its oppression, a ruling elite will continually need to 
resort to increasingly draconian laws or violence. The connection be-
tween these two notions is explored at greater length by Derrida in the 
Cardozo lecture. In drawing together the deconstructionistic and Marx-
ist views on the origin of law several common ideas arise: law cannot 
exist apart from society, but only exists in a dialectical relation with 
other factors (for example, the economy) within society; law and semiot-
ics are closely linked to use and exchange values of commodities; and 
only by understanding the origins of law can we begin to take some 
control of its future. 
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THE FUNCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF LAW 
In the discussion of the origin of law, it was said that law's 
inception was closely bound up with its functions. Here, the emphasis 
is on the functions and functioning of law, but, once again, one must 
remember that there is a great deal of overlap between these notions. In 
discussing the functions and functioning oflaw, one must, thus, keep in 
mind what was said concerning the origins oflaw. 
Deconstruction and the Function(ing) of Law 
In his lecture entitled "Force of Law", Derrida begins with a 
study of the English expression 'to enforce the law' or 'enforceability of 
the law or contract'. Implicit in this expression is the notion that law is 
always an authorized force, that it is "a force that justifies itself or is 
justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from 
elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable."78 Law and enforcement are not 
and cannot be separated: 
There are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but 
there is no law without enforceability and no applicabil-
ity or enforceability of the law without force, whether 
this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, 
exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive and 
hermeneutic, coercive or regulative, and so forth.79 
This leads to the question of the connection between law and violence. 
Derrida notes the texts of Heidegger in whose work one often 
finds the word 'Gewalt', which in English and French is often translated 
as violence. Yet, as Derrida suggests, in German this expression 
signifies both "legitimate power, authority, and force" (for example, 
gesetzgbende Gewalt or legislative power), as well as violent force. so Once 
again we are confronted with the origins oflaw and justice. 
Derrida approaches this question in his usual indirect manner. 
In this case it is through a discussion of Pascal's pensees on justice and 
Montaigne's passage which inspired it. 
In a passage which has inspired many subsequent thinkers, 
Montaigne wrote, "[a]nd so laws keep up their good standing, not 
because they are just, but because they are laws; that is the mystical 
foundation of their authority, they have no other."81 Pascal followed this 
in his Pensee 293:: 
[O]ne man says that the essence of justice is the author-
ity of the legislator, another that it is the convenience of 
the King, another that it is the current custom; and the 
latter is closest to the truth: simple reason tells us that 
nothing is just in itself; everything crumbles with time. 
Custom is the sole basis for equity, for the simple reason 
that it is received; it is the mystical foundation of 
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authority. Whoever traces it to its source annihilates 
it.82 
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Derrida draws our attention to two points: the distinction drawn 
between law and justice; and the 'mystical authority' of law. Derrida 
suggests that in the realization that law's authority is only 'mystical' one 
finds a key element in the critique of juridical ideology. It is the key to 
"the desedimentation of the superstructure of law that both hide and 
reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant forces of 
society."83 
In short, Derrida suggests that the function oflaw is bound up 
with its form as law. In Rosenfeld's paper, he discusses how the form 
ascribed to law can circumscribe its functions. He looks particularly at 
the school of legal formalism, and while questioning its ultimate value 
for the future, he suggests that with some modification it could be doing 
more to bring law up to par with the rest of our dynamic and evolving 
society. 
Rosenfeld's main concern centres on legal interpretation. More 
precisely, he rejects traditional forms of legal formalism and replaces 
them with new forms of legal formalism informed by a deconstructive 
hermeneutic (method of interpretation). Traditional formalism argues 
that application of a rule oflaw leads to a determinable outcome "due to 
the constraints imposed by the language of the rule".84 Conversely, the 
new legal formalism sees law as both dynamic, and in many important 
respects, distinct from politics. Even among the writers whose work to 
date has, in some respects, approximated this new legal formalism, (for 
example, Stanley Fish and Ernest Weinreib), Rosenfeld finds sufficient 
flaws to reject these theories. 
He praises the 'formalism' of Stanley Fish for the recognition 
that law-making involves a double-gesture, in that "[l]aw must absorb 
and internalize that which threatens it from the outside, ... [b]ut, at the 
same time, ... must deny that it is appropriating extra-legal values."85 
But Rosenfeld ultimately rejects Fish's model as a result of its 
overidentification of law with rhetoric "which is more in tune with the 
conception of deconstruction as an interpretive technique" only.86 
Notwithstanding Weinrib's assertion that law is autonomous of 
politics, he nonetheless offers a number of insights. Weinrib's use of the 
concepts of corrective and distributive justice87 is valuable, allowing for 
a distinction between past and present, between self and other, without 
the necessity of a separation between them. It is sufficient here to say 
that Rosenfeld rejects Weinrieb's model for its parallel to Kantian ethics, 
in which the self is 'subordinated to the universal',88 but Weinrib's 
influence on Rosenfeld's conclusions should not be underestimated. As 
Rosenfeld states: 
First, there is no single formula or form which underlies 
all juridical relationships or which could be relied upon 
to draw any clear cut boundaries between law and 
politics. Second, law as a practice is distinct from other 
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practices but not self-contained, as it borrows and 
incorporates elements from other social practices, and 
as it partially overlaps with such other practices ... Third, 
the law's distinct existence is not given, but must be 
constantly fought for, through a dynamic process of 
differentiation operating in a specific social and histori-
cal context and constrained by the requirement ofinteg-
rity. 89 
Rosenfeld concludes that the 'external reconciliation' promised 
by a law which has internalized some aspects of deconstruction is to be 
valued, but he leaves open the question of its more far-reaching implica-
tions for law: 
Perhaps the limitations of law could be overcome by 
supplementing its external relationships with internal 
relationships capable of fostering greater intimacy and 
solidarity between self and other. Perhaps, however, the 
ontological and ethical demands of deconstruction re-
quire the erasure of the distinction between external 
and internal relationships which may require supersed-
ing the very order established by law.90 
As much as the function oflaw informed and was informed by its 
origin, so too, the function oflaw informs and is informed by its future. 
The point is that in a deconstructionist conception, law cannot be 
considered simply as it exists today. It needs a consideration of both the 
present demands of an awareness of its history, and of an expectation for 
its future. In its insistence upon viewing law in its historical develop-
ment, Rosenfeld's criticism of legal formalism and Derrida's notion of 
law share much with the Marxist theorists who have preceded them. 
Marxism and the Function(ing) of Law 
The Hegelian dialectic subsumes difference into similarity and 
identity. This, he accomplished, through the imposition ofan ahistorical, 
and ultimately onto-theological, teleology.91 The Marxist dialectic dif-
fers in that it is rooted in history, and is based on difference (manifested 
as class inequality and opposition).92 For Marx, capitalist society 
attempts to cover up this opposition or difference through the imposition 
of equivalency in the marketplace: 
Capitalism, therefore, requires an idealizing operation 
that abstracts from inequality, identifies difference, and 
resolves seriality into a paradigm. That operation is a 
concrete version of the classical speculative dialectic. 
The aspect of the dialectic which Marx saw as being more 
helpful emphasizes the heterogeneity or scission inter-
nal to capitalism ... 'In its mystified form,' he says, the 
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'dialectic seemed to transfigure and to glorify what 
exists.' But as Marx uses it, it includes a recognition of 
the 'inevitable destruction' of 'what exists.'93 
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This notion of mystification has been employed by Marxist legal theo-
rists to explain how law manages to preserve its privileged place in the 
superstructure. 94 
An overdeterministic view would hold that the mystification of 
law is part of the ideological function that law serves in protecting 
capitalism. This ideological function is but one of three that instrumen-
talist Marxists attribute to law. The others are the facilitative and 
repressive functions. 
The facilitative functions oflaw include: (1) a system of integra-
tion and coordination; (2) legal transactions (exchange); (3) the regula-
tion of conflict; and ( 4) the realization of social values. 95 In short, these 
functions govern the everyday running of society. They are so pervasive 
that they have attained an autonomy of sorts, and a power to shape the 
people within the system. Such is the power of the facilitative functions 
of law "that logically formal rational law integrates the individual to 
system needs and not the system to human needs."96 
The repressive function of law follows from its facilitative role. 
As discussed above, for interpellative Marxists, late capitalism is char-
acterized by contradictions requiring the intervention of the legal 
system (for example, through the increase in state regulation). In 
seeking to cover over the fissures in the system, what the judiciary 
provides is "the logic for the continued domination of the non-proper-
tied"97 
Just as the repressive function is closely connected to the 
facilitative function, so too is the ideological function derived from the 
repressive function. The repressive function oflaw is legitimatizing or 
justificatory. Here, the connection to semiotics is most evident. 
A critical semiotextual analysis oflaw begins with the notion of 
a "tension between formal constraints imposed by the linguistic form on 
one hand, and pragmatism (linguistic forms in use) and subjectivity 
(need to objectify and externalize internal thoughts, feelings ... etc.) on 
the other."98 As deconstructionists recognize, language is not neutral, 
but an articulation of an ideology, or at least, an articulation containing 
an ideology. As C.W. Mills writes, "a vocabulary is not merely a string 
of words, imminent within it are societal textures - institutional and 
political coordinates."99 In the over-deterministic model, these co-
ordinates are developed by superstructural practices, most notably 
juridico-political practices. 
Milovanovic argues that the two spheres or functions oflinguis-
tic production and linguistic circulation can be seen here. Linguistic 
production entails giving content to signs, while linguistic circulation 
involves establishing those signs in popular culture.100 As the legal 
superstructure has assumed greater proportions in late capitalist soci-
ety, legal discourse has become increasingly common and influential 
even among those granted 'formal' equality rights. 
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In his introduction to Grundrisse, Marx spoke not only of the 
fetishization of commodities as necessary for the development, but also 
of a "linguistic community" which would allow the capital fetishization 
to develop.101 The birth of capitalism required both the fetishization of 
commodities and of language. As Milovanovic concludes: 
a homologous development exists between the commod-
ity, legal and linguistic form. A double obfuscation 
exists. At the first level, once linguistic codes are 
established and once the grammar of a language are in 
place in circumscribed linguistic co-ordinate systems, 
linguistic workers situating themselves within them are 
limited in structuring cognitive process.102 
In applying this to legal practice, the obvious effects are two-fold. 
First, it allows an occupational elite (the judiciary of the superior courts) 
who reflect a certain class structure to control legalistic production. 
Second, it encourages internalization of these norms by the oppressed 
classes by limiting their linguistic avenues of opposition.103 
For both the deconstructionist and the Marxist, the function(ing) 
oflaw is closely linked to the form oflaw. Derrida suggests that iflaw 
arises as a justifiable force, this character already determines in large 
measure its function. Once created, the function becomes the justifica-
tion for the continued existence of the law. This is picked up by Rosenfeld 
in his critique of the 'double-gesture' oflegal formalism, which necessar-
ily internalizes social facts, but cannot admit of doing so for fear oflosing 
its autonomy and legitimacy. This idea that law subsumes various 
functions into itself is closely connected to the Marxist critique of the 
Hegelian dialectic, and the Marxist critique oflaw. 
An overdeterministic Marxist view of law suggests that in 
capitalist society, law seeks to keep several functions to itself: the 
ideological, the facilitative, and the repressive. While each supports the 
others, all are dependant upon the ability of the dominant class to control 
discourse. While the deconstructionists maintain that the imposition of 
constraints on language precipitates the use of force, the Marxists 
suggest that the imposition of force can only be legitimated by controlling 
language and discourse. 
THE FUTURE OF LAW 
In his discussion of the functions oflaw, Rosenfeld suggests that 
in the short term a new formalism could be envisioned which would allow 
some progress to be made in development oflaw. Yet, he also questions 
whether even this revised formalism would be adequate for society's 
long-term development. In this section, I propose a brief suggestion of 
what the future may hold for law. As Rosenfeld suggests, it involves a 
radically different notion oflaw and society. 
As we have seen already, in "White Mythology" Derrida suggests 
that society both reflects and is reflected by its metaphysics. In Western 
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society, that metaphysic is that of the white Indo-European, rationalist 
male. Although in recent years law has attained more autonomy from 
economics, it has also played a greater role in maintaining this structure. 
A deconstructionist hermeneutic would share with an interpellative 
Marxist critique the view that such a concept oflaw is not necessary, any 
more than is the social structure which gives rise to it. Based on the 
foregoing discussions of the origin and function on law, a brief outline of 
a differential understanding oflaw and society which is compatible with 
a structuralist Marxist notion is presented. 
Deconstruction and the Future of Law 
It has been seen that Derrida rejects the standard view of law 
and society which suggests that law is both autonomous and prohibitive. 
Further, he clearly distinguishes between justice and law (droit), but 
says the two are necessarily joined. He writes: 
Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, 
the position of the law can't by definition rest on any-
thing but themselves, they are themselves a violence 
without ground. Which is not to say that they are in 
themselves unjust, in the sense of "illegal." They are 
neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment. They 
exceed the opposition between founded and unfounded, 
or between any foundationalism or anti-
foundationalism.104 
When laws are given effect in society, however, they lose this 
balance. At this point, law becomes deconstructible because it is founded 
either "on interpretable and transformable textual strata ... , or because 
its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded."105 This is in contrast 
with justice, which like deconstruction, Derrida holds is necessarily 
beyond deconstruction. He concludes: 
1. The deconstructibility oflaw (droit), oflegality, legiti-
macy or legitimation (for example) makes deconstruction 
possible. 2. The undeconstructability of justice also 
makes deconstruction possible, indeed is inseparable 
from it. 3. The result: deconstruction takes place in the 
interval that separates the undeconstructability of jus-
tice from the deconstructability of droit (authority, le-
gitimacy, and so on).106 
Derrida ascribes this deconstructability of traditional law at least partly 
to the fact that law is normative, while justice is always based on the 
individual. 
Since justice is based on the individual, if law is to function 
justly, the individual must be able to understand the law. Yet, as 
suggested above, this is not always the case. There are many concrete 
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examples of people tried and convicted who had little understanding of 
the language in which they were tried. In such a case, the injustice to the 
individual is obvious, but Derrida suggests this has larger ontological 
and societal consequences: 
The violence of this injustice that consists of judging 
those who don't understand the idiom in which one 
claims ... "justice is done,'' ... is not just any violence, any 
injustice. This injustice supposes that the other, the 
victim of the language's injustice, is capable of a lan-
guage in general, is a man as a speaking animal, in the 
sense that we, men, give to this word language. Moreo-
ver, there was a time, not long ago and not yet over, in 
which "we, men" meant "we adult white male Europe-
ans, carnivorous and capable of sacrifice."107 
In short, a deconstructionist approach to law involves necessar-
ily a reconsideration of what law is, but it does not stop there. 
Deconstruction demands a reconsideration of basic notions of ontology, 
which in turn demands continual reconsideration of society and 
criteriology. 
Once again, Derrida warns that the application of the supple-
ment to society should not lead to "quasi-nihilistic abdication before the 
ethico-politico-juridical question of justice", but to a positive under-
standing of the role oflaw in societyios. Derrida resists efforts to reduce 
the deconstructionist approach to a regulative scheme, although it 
surely involves this. This law, however, must be reinterpreted and re-
invented with every case. Law can have no horizon but may have an 
"avenir, a 'to come"', which Derrida distinguishes from the future which 
can always "reproduce the present".109 
A deconstructionist notion oflaw sees law as always and neces-
sarily 'differential'; law is spatially and temporally relative. In practical 
terms, it means that law cannot be seen as an autonomous entity 
existing outside society, but it is connected necessarily to the process of 
politicization. As Derrida claims, law is: 
interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be 
total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we 
must recognize in it the following consequence: each 
advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and 
so to reinterpret the very foundations oflaw such as they 
had previously been calculated or delimited. no 
It should be stressed that the politicization of law clearly does 
not mean the reduction of law to politics. To isolate politics, and place 
it above law, economics, or anything else would be merely to reform the 
scientific Marxism which has already been rejected. Thus, it would be 
necessarily incompatible with Derridean deconstruction and the form(s)of 
Marxism favoured here. 
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Marxism and the Future of Law 
Traditionally, Marxist theories have posited an end to the 
capitalist system, its replacement by socialism, and its ultimate fulfillment 
in the development of the communist state. In spite of this notion of a 
final stage, it would be wrong to consider this notion as metaphysical. 
This can be shown by comparing Marx's use of the terms 'socialism' and 
'communism'. 
The first stage- the development of state socialism- involves the 
'dictatorship of the proletariat'. In legal terms, this means the imposi-
tion of a legal structure not different in nature from the existing 
capitalist model, but with a different end.111 Instead of supporting a 
bourgeois notion of society, the structures of law would be used to 
support the interests of the proletariat. This involves the return of use 
values in place of exchange values which have been privileged under 
capitalism. Once the law has been established, it can be used to bring 
about a change in ethics, which it is asserted will bring about an end to 
the law. This marks the beginning of the last phase of society: commu-
nism. 
In the Leninist-Marxist idea of communism, state and law, (at 
least in their bourgeois incarnations), wither away. As Lenin suggests, 
in the highest form of communism people will become: 
accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social 
intercourse that have been known for centuries ... they 
will become accustomed to observing them without force, 
without compulsion, without subordination, without the 
special apparatus for compulsion which is called the 
state.112 
There will no doubt be transgressions of the social order, but 
"spontaneous controls" will arise to deal with these as the need arises.113 
Of course, this would involve not the entire class acting together, but 
small collectivist organizations working independently for the common 
purpose. 
Although many would dismiss such talk as utopian, Milovanovic 
responds to the critics in two ways. First, he asserts that these 
organizations do exist and are growing. Second, he contends that what 
has been predicted, namely the rebirth of substantive rationality in law, 
has been evidenced within many of these organizations. As proof, he 
points to the 1976 study of these collectives done by Joyce Whitt-
Rothschild. 
In 1976, these collectivist organizations numbered around 5,000 
and were on the increase.114 In her study of these groups, Whitt-
Rothschild listed eight factors common to them: 
( 1) Authority ... resides ... in the collectivity as a whole. 
The collective tries to reach a consensus on issues rather 
than talking formal motions. 
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(2) Rules are minimized in this new type of organization. 
Decisions are made as cases arise. Substantive rather 
than formal values dictate process. 
(3) Social control relies on 'personalistic and moralistic 
appeals' rather than on centralized authority. 
( 4) Social relations ... 'strive toward the ideal of commu-
nity. Relationships are to be holistic, affective, and of 
value in themselves'. 
(5) Recruitment and advancement are based on friend-
ship and social/political values. 
(6) Incentive structures rest on 'value-purposive' action 
where value fulfillment in itself is paramount; material 
incentives are not central. In fact, pay is according to 
'need'. .. 
(7) Social stratification rather than hierarchical is egali-
tarian... In the collectivist organizations studied ... a 
ratio between highest and lowest paid was never greater 
than two to one. 
(8) As far as differentiation of work roles, the ... organi-
zation places the highest value on holistic orientations to 
work. Thus through (a) rotating roles, (b) sharing tasks 
and team work, and (c) maintaining ... education to 
offset tendencies that maintain ... differentiated/spe-
cialized roles, the ... organization maintains an environ-
ment in which non-bureaucratic values are reinforced.115 
Such may be idealistic, but an ideal is not by definition impossi-
ble to attain. Nor is the notion of the ideal society as outlined here 
incompatible with a deconstructionist notion of society, although admit-
tedly the term ideal might be problematic. Ryan has suggested 'differ-
ential socialism' as a more appropriate term. 
Central to the notion of 'differential socialism' is the concept of 
'interactive adaptation.'116 In brief, interactive adaptation entails a 
critique of the contemporary monadic view of society, the obliteration of 
the distinction between theory and action, an attempt at genuine 
pluralism, and of course, a new conception oflaw. 
A deconstructionist notion oflaw demands a reconsideration of 
the ontology oflaw, and relation between law and society. Law must 
become more consonant with justice, which demands a change in the way 
law is applied. It cannot simply be a set of a priori rules which will apply 
to all people in all places and at all times. Law must achieve a balance 
between predictability and sensitivity to situation which it has hereto-
fore lacked. This demands a sensitivity to changing time and locale, but 
also an awareness of the differing needs of people based on race, religion, 
and gender, to name but a few of the many factors. 
This notion of 'differential socialism' - ofradical alterity applied 
to society - bears many similarities to the notion of communism, the 
'penultimate stage' of social development found in Marxist theory. Here 
the words 'penultimate stage' are in quotation marks to stress that in the 
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Marxist model, communism is neither fully 'the final stage' nor really a 
stage at all. The Marxist model requires the movement to small-scale 
differentially-based communities with laws which must balance the 
ever-changing intracommunal and intercommunal needs. 
CONCLUSION 
Adam Smith's contradictions are of significance because they contain 
problems which it is true he does not resolve, but which he reveals by 
contradicting himself 
Karl Marx 117 
As the above quotation suggests the notion of contradiction 
played a central role in the thought of Marx. In praxis, these ruptures 
would bring about the downfall of capitalism, while in theory they 
provide the loci of attack. Such a critique shares much with the 
Derridean school of deconstruction. The deconstructionist critique of 
literature and society attempts to show the contradictions underlying 
traditional structuralist thought - contradictions which the prevailing 
philosophies suppress necessarily through recourse to metaphysics or 
violence. 
As suggested at the outset, that considerable similarities exist 
between the Marxist and the deconstructionistic critiques of society 
should not come as a surprise to anyone with a familiarity with the 
writings of Marx or Derrida. Although they began their respective 
careers in different fields, both begin their works with a rejection of the 
Hegelian idealism. Through their writings, they both sought to apply 
this inverted dialectic to social theory. Since both recognized the role 
that law has played and continues to play in perpetuating social norms, 
it is not surprising that their respective theories oflaw manifest a great 
many similarities. 
With respect to the origins of law, both suggest that law is 
inseparable from the society in which it exists. Whether it is done 
through an ontological critique of Rousseau's origin oflaw, or a histori-
cal-economic analysis of early capitalism, the notion of law as an 
autonomous object acting upon society from the outside is clearly 
rejected. Instead, Marx and Derrida view law as both a factor in 
determining ideology and as a repository for these views. Here Derrida, 
echoing Montaigne and Pascal, sees law as operating in a 'mystifying' 
way. The notion of 'mystification' is also central to a Marxist critique of 
law and economics. 
In interpellative structuralist Marxism, law is but one part of 
the superstructure which interacts with the economy to form society. As 
capitalism has developed from a use-oriented system to one based on 
exchange, law has taken on different and greater functions. These 
include the facilitative, repressive and ideological functions. Funda-
mental to contemporary Marxist notions of ideology is the role that 
language and literature play in circumscribing discourse and dissent. 
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For Derrida, the future of law cannot be separated from the 
future of society, and vice versa. Thus a deconstructive analysis oflaw 
involves a deconstruction of society, and vice versa. In Derrida's notion 
of a differential society, law, like society, will be more egalitarian and 
open-ended. There will be less bureaucracy and less emphasis on the 
prohibitive dimension of law, because people will evolve beyond the 
stage ofrelying on it as we do today. Similarly, in Marxist theory, the 
transformation from capitalism to state socialism to communism will be 
accompanied by a change in human nature. At the same time that 
society is moving away from centralized bureaucratic state agencies, 
people will begin to move towards collective values characterized by use 
values in exchange. Thus for both deconstructionism and Marxism, law 
as it exists today will wither away, and be replaced by a system 
characterized by informal gatherings of small groups. 
In conclusion, it might be said that the critics who suggest that 
Ryan's term 'differential socialism' is an oxymoron are clearly mistaken. 
If anything, I suggest that using both terms may indeed be redundant. 
APPENDIX 118 
To understand fully the implications of such a view demands an 
understanding of the dialectical theories to which deconstructionism is 
related, but ultimately rejects. Among the most important are Hegel's 
dialectic and the Heideggerian 'destruction of being'. 
Hegel analogizes his onto-theological theory with the relation-
ship of a text with its preface. His notion of the relationship between the 
two = signifier/signified, where the"=" he calls the Aufhebung: 
Aufhebung is a relationship between two terms where 
the second at once annuls the first and lifts it up into a 
higher sphere of existence; it is a hierarchical concept 
generally translated as 'sublation' and now sometimes 
translated 'sublimation.' A successful preface is 
aufgehoben into the text it precedes, just as a word is 
aufgehoben into its meaning.119 
Here, the reason for the deconstructionist rejection- the recourse to a 
higher plane- is obvious. It is less so, but no less problematic in the work 
of Martin Heidegger to whom Derrida often refers. 
In Zur Seinfrage Heidegger outlines his concept of 'Being under 
erasure,' (simultaneous being and non-being) which he represents by 
Being.120 Being represents a rejection of the pre-comprehended notion of 
being, which Heidegger, like Derrida later, is forced to confront as a 
result of the general problem of language and metaphysics (once one 
applies a word, one has in some sense 'captured' what really cannot be 
captured). Yet, here is where the similarities to Derrida's work end: 
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To be sure, when Heidegger sets Being before all con-
cepts, he is attempting to free language from the fallacy 
of a fixed origin, which is also a fixed end.121 
117 
But, in a certain way, he also sets up Being as what Derrida calls the 
"transcendental signified." For whatever a concept might "mean," 
anything that is conceived of in its being-present must lead us to the 
already-answered question of Being. In that sense, the sense of the final 
reference, Being is indeed the final signified to which all signifiers refer. 
But Heidegger makes it clear that Being cannot be contained by, is 
always prior to, indeed transcends, signification. It is therefore a 
situation where the signified commands, and is yet free of, all signifiers-
a recognizably theological situation. 
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